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I. THE SELF-HELP PROBLEM IN INFORMAL PARTNERSHIPS
A. The Scenario
Jerry, Nick, and Lorenzo Monteleone formed a partnership to own
and operate the Monte Auto Body Shop.' The brothers had no writ-
ten partnership agreement. 2 But they had agreed to split profits and
losses, and contribute capital and labor, equally.3 Each would receive
weekly compensation. 4 Because the three had no other agreements,
to that extent their arrangement was governed by the default provi-
sions of the partnership code.5 Because the brothers did not have any
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. Thanks to Robert W. Hillman and Gary
Rosin for comments and conversations prior to publication.
1. Monteleone v. Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d 1221, 1223 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1225.
4. Id.
5. That would be the result under the Texas Business Organizations Code. See TEX. Bus.
OROS. CODE ANN. § 152.002(a) (2013) ("To the extent that the partnership agreement does not
259
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agreement regarding the length of time their partnership would last,
and they undertook an activity of indefinite duration (as opposed to a
specific task), their partnership was at will.6
Several years after the partnership formed, Nick and Lorenzo came
to believe that Jerry had wronged them and the partnership. Jerry
took too much money in his weekly draw,7 misappropriating partner-
ship funds.8 Jerry also failed to contribute equally, demanded that his
son be made a partner in the business, required (over Nick and Lo-
renzo's decision otherwise) 9 that a certain employee be discharged,
and refused to return certain "partnership books and records."' 0
Nick and Lorenzo might have consulted a lawyer. They could have
sued Jerry. But this would have been the first time that the three en-
gaged the legal system. They were, after all, a partnership by default.
Rather than obtain the help of others, Nick and Lorenzo engaged in
self-help. They excluded Jerry from the premises. Nick and Lorenzo
continued to operate the business."
So Jerry sued, alleging that Nick and Lorenzo had wrongfully ex-
cluded him, thus "effecting a dissolution of the partnership."12 Jerry
asked for a ruling that the partnership had dissolved, a wind-up of its
otherwise provide, this chapter and the other partnership provisions govern the relationship of
the partners and between the partners and the partnership."); see, e.g., ALAN R. BROMBERG &
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 7.02(c)(3) (2010).
6. See Bendalin v. Youngblood & Assocs., 381 S.W.3d 719, 740 (Tex. App. 2012); Monteleone,
497 N.E.2d at 1225; see also Jordon v. Bowman Apple Prods. Co., 728 F. Supp. 409, 416 (W.D.
Va. 1990); Chandler Med. Bldg. Partners v. Chandler Dental Grp., 855 P.2d 787, 793-94 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1993); Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 42-44 (Cal. 1961); Fischer v. Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98,
104-05 (Ky. 2006); Miami Subs Corp. v. Murray Family Trust, 703 A.2d 1366, 1370-71 (N.H.
1997); Girard Bank v. Haley, 332 A.2d 443, 447 (Pa. 1975); Canter's Pharmacy, Inc. v. Elizabeth
Assocs., 578 A.2d 1326, 1329-30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
7. Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d at 1225.
8. Id. at 1223.
9. In a partnership, "[elach partner has equal rights in the management and conduct of the
business." TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.203(a) (2013). "A difference arising in a matter
in the ordinary course of the partnership business may be decided by a majority-in-interest of the
partners." Id. § 152.209(a). Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, such a "difference ...
may be decided by a majority of the partners." R.U.P.A § 401() (1997). In this case, as in most
informal partnerships, the difference between the TBOC and RUPA does not matter, because
the partners have agreed to split profits equally. An equal split of profits is also the default rule
under the TBOC. See TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.202(c) (2013). An equal split of prof-
its among the partners renders application of "majority-in-interest" and the per capita rule of
RUPA identical. See id. § 151.001(4) (specifying that "majority-in-interest" is determined by
stake in profits, absent agreement otherwise). If the default rule for profits is equality, then each
partner has an interest equal to their per capita standing.
10. Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d at 1223.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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business, and damages.13 Nick and Lorenzo counterclaimed, of
course.14 Jerry was the wrongdoer, they asserted; Jerry's claim must
have seemed like sheer chutzpah.
B. The Law: An Introduction
Nevertheless, a certain view of the law suggests that Jerry was right.
The common law does not provide partners a right to expel one of
their own.' 5 For statutory authority in this Article, I intend to refer-
ence the Texas General Partnership Law,16 a statute largely inspired
by the Revised Uniform Partnership Act.'7 I prefer to work with the
law of a certain place, as opposed to a uniform code. Texas is a large
state, and this statute governs many informal partnerships. Moreover,
Texas courts have dealt with the self-help fact pattern numerous times,
and, if Texas' helpful case law is to remain relevant, the statutes cur-
rently in force there should remain supportive. The Texas General
Partnership Law, just like the various versions of the Uniform Part-
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying New York law);
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft v. Beasley, 728 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 592 (N.Y. 1996); Dillard v. Wholesale, 286 S.W.2d
675, 677 (Tex. App. 1956) ("at law a partner may not expel another partner"); see also, e.g.,
Rowley v. Fuhrman, 982 P.2d 940, 944 (Idaho 1999) (joint venture); Allan W. Vestal, Law Part-
ner Expulsions, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1083, 1111, 1110 n.205 (1998) (listing numerous au-
thorities). In Gregan v. Kelly, 355 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 2011), the court extolled at length that
partnerships were at will, citing Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998). But
Bohatch merely meant that no ground for expulsion is required when the partnership agreement
already provides for expulsion. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 545-47. The partnership agreement in
Bohatch "contemplate[d] expulsion of a partner and prescribe[d] procedures to be followed."
Id. at 546. The agreement clearly provided a right to expel. Gregan was also a suit alleging
breach of a partnership agreement and partnership fiduciary duties. 355 S.W.2d at 227, 230-31.
Whether the plaintiff there was a partner or merely an employee was not clearly settled in the
trial court, and the plaintiff failed to cause the issue to be submitted to the jury, which merely
held that the relationship was at will. Id. at 231. In rejecting the plaintiff's claims of fiduciary
duty breach, the court purported to analyze both at-will employment and at-will partnership law.
Id. at 230-31. If a partnership's at-will status equated to employment at will, then it might be
possible to expel a partner without anything about expulsion mentioned in the partnership
agreement. In affirming as a matter of partnership law the plaintiff's dismissal from a law part-
nership whose partnership agreement lacked an expulsion provision, the Gregan court appears
to suggest that no expulsion agreement is necessary. Id. But Bohatch held no such thing, and in
this Gregan is contrary to Dillard and perhaps section 152.501 of the TBOC.
16. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 1.008(f) (2013) authorizes this designation to Chapters
151, 152, and 154 of the TBOC.
17. 19 ELIZABETH S. MILLER & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 6:1 (3d ed. 2011); compare TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.501 with
R.U.P.A. § 601 (1997). While Texas uses the word "withdraw" where the RUPA employs "dis-
sociate," the concepts operate similarly, the statutes employ a similar logic, and the substantive
grounds for either are in all cases relevant to this article more or less identical.
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nership Act, provides the means for partners to part ways." Read
somewhat narrowly, the statute appears to favor Jerry.
This might seem odd. If Jerry is harming the business, locking Jerry
out of the premises appears necessary to protect the business. The law
should favor preservation and enhancement of productive enter-
prise-in this case, a profitable body shop. If locking out a destructive
partner is the only way to prevent harm to the business, and the other
partners are the only ones capable of doing so (or perhaps the only
ones able to do so in the required time frame), then the law should
support them.
While some courts, including the Monteleone court,19 have granted
protection to self-helpers such as Nick and Lorenzo,20 these scenarios
are more complex than they first appear. Self-help's complexity arises
in informal partnerships in part because the parties themselves do not
bother to fit their actions intentionally into available legal categories.
The self-help problem is similar to the issue of whether a partnership
formed by default. Cases addressing whether a partnership formed on
facts showing no formal partnership creation are legion.21 A partner-
ship can form even when the parties intended their relationship to be
something else.22 In these cases, courts sort out hard-to-categorize
18. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.501(b) (2013).
19. Monteleone v. Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d 1221, 1223 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
20. See Ohlendorf v. Feinstein, 636 SW.2d 687, 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("There is no doubt
that Ohlendorf wrongfully breached the partnership agreement causing a dissolution of the part-
nership."); Schnitzer v. Josephthal, 202 N.Y.S. 77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1923); M.R. Champion, Inc. v.
Mizell, 904 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); see also Stiles v. Bradley, 117 N.Y.S. 637 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1909) (holding, pre-UPA, that a law partner who was to devote all time to the practice
breached the agreement by becoming a justice of the peace, thereby making himself too busy to
fulfill his partnership obligations and justifying his partner in declaring their partnership for a
term to be at an otherwise premature end); Drashner v. Sorensen, 63 N.W.2d 255, 252-53 (S.D.
1954) ("[T]he insistent and continuing demands of the plaintiff ... rendered it reasonably im-
practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him. . . . [T]he evidence supports the
finding that plaintiff caused the dissolution wrongfully."). Some commentators have also sup-
ported this approach. See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW
AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPs § 16:14 (2013) ("[T]he better approach
permits courts to exercise their equitable powers and hold that partner misconduct which gives
rise to a dissolution decree also permits application of UPA § 38(2) sanctions" available only
when a partner wrongfully causes dissolution.).
21. See, e.g., BROMBERG & RIESTEIN, supra note 5, §§ 2.05-2.09, 2.14 (indeed, most of chapter
2); MILLER & RAGAZZO, supra note 17, §§ 6:6-6:8.
22. E.g., Vohland v. Sweet, 433 N.E.2d 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming a finding as a
partnership what both parties appeared to treat as employment with commissions); Lupien v.
Malsbenden, 477 A.2d 746 (Me. 1984) (affirming a finding of a partnership when both parties
apparently believed that their relationship was a creditor-borrower relationship). Conversely, a
partnership does not result merely because people refer to each other as partners. See, e.g.,
Beecher v. Bush, 7 N.W. 785, 785 (Mich. 1881) ("If they agree upon an arrangement which is a
partnership in fact, it is of no importance that they call it something else, or that they even
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facts that the parties did not plan in advance with partnership law in
mind. In both kinds of cases-partnership beginnings and partnership
endings-later analysis must fit the facts into available legal catego-
ries. There is not always a close fit, and the potential for inconsistency
across several such cases is greater because the parties' conduct may
be characterized in several ways. This is a common problem in part-
nership law.2 3
The Texas General Partnership Law offers a cafeteria of categories
under which lawyers may argue informal partnership self-help facts.
These categories fit within a broader structure of partnership termina-
tion rules. "A partnership is an entity distinct from its partners." 24
So, though a partner may leave the partnership-an event known as
"withdrawal" 25-" [a] partnership continues after an event of with-
drawal." 26 The continuing partnership may continue its business, not-
withstanding a withdrawal, unless "an event requiring a winding up"
occurs. 27 "Winding up" is liquidation of the partnership's business
and termination of the partnership.28 "In winding up the partnership
business, the property of the partnership . .. shall be applied to dis-
charge its obligations to creditors," and "surplus shall be applied to
pay in cash the net amount distributable to partners .".. ."29 Events
requiring a wind-up are specifically defined; however, a mere with-
drawal is not one of them.30
In the self-help cases we are considering, the partners have parted
ways. The association of Nick, Lorenzo, and Jerry, for business pur-
poses, is no more. Perhaps a withdrawal occurred at some point in
this fact scenario. Withdrawal under the code purports to be a techni-
cal, defined term.3' While it includes actions Jerry might take-ex-
pressing his will to withdraw and filing bankruptcy32-it also includes
expressly declare that they are not to be partners. The law must declare what is the legal import
of their agreements, and names go for nothing when the substance of the arrangement shows
them to be inapplicable."); City of Corpus Christi v. Bayfront Assocs., 814 S.W.2d 98, 109 n.4
(Tex. App. 1991) ("[A] duck which is called a horse does not become a horse; a duck is a duck.").
23. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HILLMAN, DONALD J. WEIDNER & ALLAN G. DONN, THE REVISED
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr 403-05 (2013-2014 ed. 2013) (noting a variety of ways in which
partners may express, by words or by actions, a will to withdraw, and the variety of ways in
which courts can, and have, responded).
24. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.056 (2013).
25. See id. § 152.501.
26. Id. § 152.502.
27. Id. § 152.701.
28. Id. §§ 152.701, 152.706.
29. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.706(a)-(b).
30. See id. §§ 11.051, 11.057.
31. Id. § 152.501(b).
32. Id. § 152.501(b)(1), 152.501(b)(6)(A).
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actions others might take with respect to Jerry: his "expulsion as pro-
vided by the partnership agreement," 33 his "expulsion by judicial de-
cree" for wrongful conduct, 34 someone else's filing an involuntary
bankruptcy against Jerry,35 or Jerry's death.36 It may also occur by
operation of law.37
When informal partners engage in self-help, it is often not clear
whether withdrawal occurred, or, if it did, what kind of withdrawal
occurred. In fact, courts have handled self-help cases in just about
every way imaginable. Perhaps no withdrawal occurred-none was
intended.38 Cases so concluding are discussed in Part II.A.1. But why
didn't the conduct of the excluding partners (Nick and Lorenzo) ex-
press their will to disassociate or withdraw? It is hard to argue that
Nick and Lorenzo meant to continue with Jerry in the association we
call partnership. Part II.A.2 discusses cases ruling that the excluding
conduct withdrew the excluding partners, not the excluded one.
Still other cases suggest that the excluding conduct is an expulsion.
If the partnership agreement did not provide for expulsion, then this
expulsion is a breach of the partnership agreement. Cases so conclud-
ing-and awarding damages for the breach-are discussed in Part
II.A.3. Finally, some cases focus on the conduct of the excluded part-
ner-on Jerry's conduct. Noting the wrongfulness of the conduct,
these courts conclude that Jerry's conduct itself causes a withdrawal.
These cases are discussed in Part II.B. Less directly supported by stat-
utory language, these cases are best rationalized as grounded in
contract.
Such variety! What to do? Analyzing these cases closely, I reach
two conclusions. First, all of these cases are based on reasonable read-
ings of the partnership code. This is not obvious, particularly in the
cases focusing on the conduct of the excluded partner. However, as
discussed in Part II, the code is flexible enough to support each result.
Second, the reason the cases reach different results is that, notwith-
standing the strong similarities between the cases, they ultimately
have different facts. Most importantly, their partnership agreements,
and the kind of breach that occurred, differ. Of course, in an informal
partnership, the explicit partnership agreement is minimal. The
agreements in these cases are largely inferred by the courts based on
33. Id. § 152.501(b)(3).
34. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.501(b)(5).
35. Id. § 152.501(b)(6)(A).
36. Id. § 152.501(b)(7)(A).
37. Id. § 152.501(b)(2).
38. See infra, Part II.A.1.
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the partnership's business and the way the partners have acted in the
past. These are intensely factual decisions, and they depend, to some
extent, on assumptions that businesspeople, lawyers, and judges bring
to the situation. But, in the end, the facts differ.
Because the variety of decisions in this area largely reflects factual
differences, this Article concludes that there is no need to reform the
code. These cases call not for reform, but merely for rationalization. 39
Part III concludes by summarizing the available options and sug-
gesting, roughly, when courts should select each.
II. LEGAL RESPONSES TO SELF-HELP
A. Code Options
1. No Withdrawal
Perhaps the consequence of self-help behavior is that nothing hap-
pens: it has no legal effect. This seems counter-intuitive. Self-help
activity seems always to break the "association of two or more persons
to carry on a business for profit as owners." 40 This is the current lan-
guage of the partnership code that, at one time, was thought to define
the concept of partnership.41 The current code also calls a partnership
an entity distinct from its partners, however.42 Is it possible that con-
duct breaking the partnership association could also leave the partner-
ship intact?
Read narrowly, the code's provisions describing withdrawal-pri-
marily section 152.501(b)43-include only conduct well within the
meaning of the language of that section.44 "'Event of withdrawal' or
'withdrawal' means an event specified by Section 152.501(b)." 45 The
use of the word "means" suggests that the code wants 501(b) to ex-
haust the code's possibilities for withdrawal. 46 What that actually en-
39. Forty years ago, Robert W. Hillman briefly addressed self-help in partnership break-ups in
a longer article on partnership misconduct as a ground for expulsion. Robert W. Hillman, Mis-
conduct as a Basis for Excluding or Expelling a Partner: Effecting Commercial Divorce and Se-
curing Custody of the Business, 78 Nw U. L. REV. 527, 539-44 (1983). On the basis of only a few
cases and brief policy analysis but with keen insight into the Uniform Partnership Act, Hillman
presciently announced: "The issue is best resolved by focusing on the objectives of the dissolving
partners and permitting a limited use of self-help." Id. at 543. Analyzing in detail the terms of a
later partnership code, surveying the policy landscape, and, with the help of several cases that
have now addressed the issue, I reach the same conclusion.
40. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.051(b).
41. See, e.g., U.P.A. § 6 (1914).
42. TEx. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.056.
43. Id. § 152.501(b).
44. Id. § 152.501(b) ("An event of withdrawal of a partner occurs on: . .
45. Id. § 152.001(1).
46. Id.
266 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:259
tails for partnership law is not as clear, as discussed in Part II.B.2. 47
However, a court thinking narrowly within the language of the code,
and not prompted by the facts of a case to take a second look, may
well stop with what the code makes most obvious.
The legal result may be that, unless the conduct of the self-helpers
seems to fall within the language of 501(b), it has no effect at all. An
example might be Deere v. Ingram.48 Deere was a medical doctor and
Ingram a psychologist.49 The two agreed orally to work together in a
new pain clinic.50 Ingram could not operate the clinic without a medi-
cal doctor.51 The two agreed to split revenues and, on that basis,
worked together for over a year. 52 Then, Ingram prepared a written
agreement in which he claimed that he owned the clinic and that
Deere was a mere employee.53 Deere in response "left the premises
... and never returned." 54 Deere appears to have seen Ingram's ac-
tions as a breach,55 and his self-help solution was to walk away.56
However, there was also evidence that Ingram told Deere to go,57 also
a form of self-help.
The break-up in Deere v. Ingram looks suspiciously like voluntary
withdrawal. The nearest code language indicates that withdrawal oc-
curs on "receipt by the partnership of notice of the partner's express
will to withdraw as a partner."58 The code retains the suggestion that
a partnership is formed by "an association of two or more persons to
carry on a business for profit as owners." 59 When a person walks out
and never returns, especially if such action is done in response to an
47. See infra Part II.B.2.
48. Deere v. Ingram, 198 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. App. 2006), rev'd on other grounds, 288 S.W.3d 886
(Tex. 2009).
49. Id. at 99.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Deere, 198 S.W.3d at 99.
54. Id. at 101.
55. See Appellants' Brief, Deere, 198 S.W.3d 95 (No. 05-05-00063-CV), 2005 WL 1658591 at
*4-5.
56. Deere's brief shows a more understandable statement of facts: Ingram's personal finances
were poor; he kept asking for a larger share of the revenue and finally asked Deere to sign an
agreement stating Deere was Ingram's employee; Deere refused to sign, and Ingram said it ap-
peared they could not get along and handed Deere a check for what Ingram supposedly thought
was Deere's balance; and the next week when Deere was to come see a patient, Ingram called
and "told him not to come because he had hired a new physician." Id. These facts come from
the record. If they are correct, the understanding that Deere did not express the will to with-
draw is more understandable and supportive of the jury's verdict for Deere.
57. Id.
58. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.501(b)(1) (2013).
59. Id. § 152.051(b).
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associate's order, has their association not ended? Is the person who
left still carrying on a business? For profit? Do we require an affirm-
ative statement? Does substance count for nothing?
Deere sued Ingram three years later, and a jury awarded him reve-
nues from the business for the period after he walked out.60 That
holding is possible only if Deere's leaving was not a withdrawal. 61
The court held that it was not: "This evidence alone does not affirm-
atively establish that Deere abandoned the partnership." 6 2 The court
cited what it believed was evidence that Deere had not abandoned the
partnership, but that evidence was extraordinarily slight. The court
noted that "Deere testified [in court] that he had no desire to with-
draw from the partnership and that he did not abandon the partner-
ship." 63 Also, the court explained that "Deere never stated that he
was backing out on their oral agreement." 64 This is all the court said.
So, as reasoned by this opinion, you can leave the business and never
return, but if you later sue and testify that you had no desire to with-
draw, you are still a partner.65
Faced with Jerry's disloyal acts and wanting to preserve the busi-
ness, Nick and Lorenzo changed the locks. It is possible that a court,
as in Deere, would conclude that this was not an event of withdrawal
as defined in the statute. After all, Jerry never expressed a will to
withdraw. In fact, Jerry still wanted the partnership business.66 He
even wanted his son to participate in it.67 Under Deere, Jerry did not
withdraw. Nick and Lorenzo could also say in court that they had no
desire to withdraw and did not abandon the partnership; on the con-
trary, they were protecting it. They never stated that they were back-
ing out of their oral agreement. Instead, by protecting the business,
they were acting to shore up the oral agreement.
60. Deere v. Ingram, 198 S.W.3d 96, 99 (Tex. App. 2006).
61. Deere would have had no interest in the revenues, otherwise. Instead, he would have had
an interest in the business as of the day he withdrew, which would need to be redeemed. At the
time Deere took place, that right was set forth in Texas Revised Partnership Act Art. 6132b-7.01
(1999); now it appears in TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.601 (2013). In the case of the pain
clinic, it is likely that the goodwill of the alleged partnership in Deere would not have belonged
to Deere for long after the break-up. See Salinas v. Rafati, 948 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. 1997) (holding
that earning capacity of professionals is nearly always personal to them and therefore not a
partnership asset). Deere himself claimed that the clinic was successful partly on the basis of his
own reputation, while he was there. Appellants' Brief, supra note 55, at *4.
62. Deere, 198 S.W.3d at 101.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See a similar holding in In re Woskob, 305 F.3d 177, 182-84 (3d Cir. 2002).
66. Monteleone v. Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d 1221, 1223 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
67. Id.
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One could argue that a more closely relevant subsection of the stat-
ute might be the general expulsion provision, which holds that a with-
drawal occurs on "the partner's expulsion as provided by the
partnership agreement."68 Were Nick and Lorenzo's actions not an
expulsion? The Deere court dealt with this possibility, too. Ingram
claimed to have expelled Deere,69 and Deere's brief to the court re-
ported that Ingram had told Deere not to come to the office any-
more.70 But this was not enough for the court: "The statute reads: 'the
partner's expulsion as provided in the partnership agreement.' There is
no evidence in the record that the parties orally or in writing agreed
that a specified event would lead to a partner's expulsion. Accord-
ingly, Ingram's reliance on this event of withdrawal is misplaced." 71 If
we read the statute to require a kind of formal act of agreement, as
this passage seems to require, then Nick and Lorenzo's act of locking
Jerry out is not a withdrawal by expulsion. Nick, Lorenzo, and Jerry
had no more formality in their partnership agreement than did Ingram
and Deere. If the court is looking for a specific provision, it will not
find one. So Jerry would remain a partner.
If Deere were the sum of the law, what should Nick and Lorenzo
do? Jerry is causing problems. They do not want to withdraw from
the partnership because they want to continue running the business.
Jerry is not about to withdraw; he, too, wants the business. 72 So what
options would Nick and Lorenzo have?
Their options are limited. They should consult a lawyer instead of
changing the locks. The Texas General Partnership Law purports to
offer a way to preserve the business. The following withdrawal provi-
sion seems to be the only one helpful:
(b) An event of withdrawal of a partner occurs on: ... (5) the part-
ner's expulsion by judicial decree, on application by the partnership
or another partner, if the judicial decree determines that the
partner:
(A) engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely and materially
affected the partnership business;
(B) wilfully [sic] or persistently committed a material breach of:
(i) the partnership agreement; or (ii) a duty owed to the partner-
ship or the other partners under Sections 152.204-152.206; or
68. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.501(b)(3) (2013).
69. Deere, 198 S.W.3d at 101.
70. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 55.
71. Deere, 198 S.W.3d at 101-02 (quoting Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132b-6.01(b)(3)
(Vernon Supp. 2005) (citations omitted).
72. See Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d at 1223 ("Jerry filed a motion requesting that the court order
a judicial sale of partnership assets prior to the court's decision on the issues of the parties'
interests in the business .... ).
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(C) engaged in conduct relating to the partnership that made it
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partner-
ship with that partner[.] 73
This section was obviously placed in the code to deal with a partner
such as Jerry. A partner who misappropriates partnership funds,
hides and refuses to return books and records, and does not abide by
management decisions of the partnership engages in wrongful conduct
that materially affects the partnership business. Such conduct is a
breach of the partner's duties under sections 152.204-152.206, which
describe the duty of loyalty.74 Even refusal to abide by management
decisions may be disloyal.75 And carrying on a business in partnership
with one who engages in such conduct may not be reasonable. 76
No method exists to calculate with certainty how long it will take to
obtain a decree of expulsion, but Nick and Lorenzo's counsel should
seek an immediate temporary restraining order and a temporary in-
junction. Depending on how long it takes their lawyer to draft a com-
plaint, they could have a ruling on a temporary restraining order a day
or so after they contact their lawyer. In the meantime, they can re-
main at the partnership premises to watch what Jerry does there, if
anything, or they can hire someone to do so. If Jerry tries to enter,
however, it would be difficult to stop him. He is still a partner. As a
partner, Jerry is a manager of the business and has a right to enter.77
Once the injunction is in place and Jerry is notified, the concern for
the business would likely abate.
2. Withdrawal
Most courts do not read the code so narrowly, and many cases pre-
sent facts that speak more strongly. Most courts do not require an
73. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.501(b)(5).
74. See id. §§ 152.204 -. 206. Refusal to return books also violates other duties to the partner-
ship and the other partners. See id. § 152.212.
75. Though all partners, as owners, have residual management authority, id. § 152.303(a), dif-
ferences among the partners on management issues "may be decided by a majority-in-interest of
the partners" or in some other manner specified by the partnership agreement. Id. § 152.209(a);
see id. § 152.002(a). Loyalty, at a minimum, requires that the partners not act adversely to the
interests of the partnership. See id. § 152.205(2)-(3). Once the partnership's interests are deter-
mined by its management authority, acting contrary to management's decision appears to be
acting adversely to the partnership. In a partnership of three or more, the code's default rules
generally determine who is the partnership's ultimate managing authority. In a partnership of
two, this is far more difficult. See, e.g., Covalt v. High, 675 P.2d 999 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (sug-
gesting that equal partners remain independent managers with power to set partnership manage-
ment goals, despite disagreement); Nat'l Biscuit Co. v. Stroud, 106 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. 1959)
(same).
76. See, e.g., Brennan v. Lehn, 2006 WL 2949111, at *12-14 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006).
77. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.203(a)-(b) (2013).
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express statement of withdrawal; rather, conduct may give notice of
express will to withdraw. These courts are likely to find that Nick and
Lorenzo's actions had a legal effect. Such a court might hold that
Nick and Lorenzo had themselves withdrawn.
"An event of withdrawal of a partner occurs on . . . receipt by the
partnership of notice of the partner's express will to withdraw as a
partner .".. ."78 Did this happen to Nick and Lorenzo? The first act
by a partner expressing what looks like a will to withdraw was Nick
and Lorenzo's exclusion of Jerry from the shop. Did this give Jerry
notice of Nick and Lorenzo's express will to withdraw from the part-
nership? A partnership is created by "an association of two or more
persons to carry on a business for profit as owners." 79 When Nick and
Lorenzo made clear that they no longer intended to associate with
Jerry in this business as co-owners, by excluding Jerry from the prem-
ises, they appeared to withdraw. 0
In Rhue v. Dawson,8' Rhue and Dawson agreed to be partners in
the development, operation, and sale of a shopping center.82 The
partnership agreement was oral at first,83 but Dawson produced a
written agreement a few days later." Rhue did not read the docu-
ment but instead asked Dawson questions about it, which Dawson an-
swered; Rhue then signed.85 Dawson had slipped in an onerous term,
however. When Rhue discovered the term two months later, he sent
Dawson a letter claiming he would not be bound by it.86 Dawson re-
sponded by locking Rhue out of partnership offices. The court called
this an "ouster,"87 a non-statutory term. But the court was clear on
the effect: Dawson had "dissolved" the partnership, the rough
78. Id. § 152.501(b)(1).
79. Id. § 152.051(b). The provision says such an association "creates a partnership," a phrase
that does not exclude a partnership being created in some other way. Id. Because the phrase is
no longer considered by the code to be definitional, the removal of a partner no longer results in
the partnership ceasing, or dissolving, as the UPA put it. Rather, the partnership, which "is an
entity distinct from its partners," id. § 152.056, continues with a slightly different set of partners.
See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, RUPA and Former Partners: Cutting the Gordian Knot with Con-
tinuing Partnership Entities, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (1995). Moreover, the partnership as
an entity might possibly continue when one of two partners withdraws. See infra note 93-94 and
accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., BROMBERG & RIBSTEHN, supra note 5, § 7.02(c)(4) & n.39 ("by ejecting a partner
and carrying on the business separately").
81. Rhue v. Dawson, 841 P.2d 215 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
82. Id. at 218, 222-23.
83. Id. at 222.
84. Id. at 219.
85. Id.
86. Rhue, 841 P.2d at 219.
87. Id. at 222 n.10 & 223.
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equivalent under the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) of an event of
withdrawal-withdrawal by Dawson, that is. Nick and Lorenzo ap-
pear to have "ousted" Jerry in a similar manner. At the very least,
they manifested their will no longer to associate with Jerry in the
business.88
The consequence of Nick and Lorenzo's withdrawal by express will
from an at-will partnership may be that the partnership continues.
This counter-intuitive result flows from the rule that "[a] partnership
is an entity distinct from its partners" 89 and the related rule that "[a]
partnership continues after an event of withdrawal." 90 No event re-
quiring a wind-up under the statute has occurred.9' Whether a part-
nership continues when only one partner is left is the subject of some
dispute,92 and it also seems plausible that a court would rely on the
traditional definition of partnership ("an association of two or more")
to say that the partnership ended.93
Either way, Nick and Lorenzo did not want to be held as having
withdrawn. If the partnership as an entity continues after Nick and
Lorenzo withdraw, then it is in the hands of Jerry, who is the sole
88. For similar cases, see Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661 (1st Cir.
1984); Schoenborn v. Schoenborn, 402 N.W.2d 212, 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (reporting the
trial court's decision). In Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 1996), the partners in a
law partnership, on discovering their partnership agreement lacked an expulsion term, intention-
ally withdrew from the firm (called a "dissolution" under the applicable partnership law). Id. at
592. That was the only way they could think of to rid themselves of the partner with whom they
no longer wished to associate.
89. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.056 (2013).
90. Id. § 152.202.
91. See id. §§ 11.051, 11.057, 152.701.
92. See Robert W. Hillman & Donald J. Weidner, Partners Without Partners: The Legal Status
of Single Person Partnerships, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 449 (2012) (arguing both sides).
In In re Leal, 360 B.R. 231 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (Texas law), a bankruptcy judge opined that,
"[b]ecause a partnership requires two or more partners, [one partner's] letter expressing his will
to withdraw from the partnership was effectively a request for a winding up of the partnership."
Id. at 240. Moreover, the court said that winding up was required because the remaining partner
did not have a majority-in-interest. Id. at 240 n.7.
93. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.051 (entitled "Partnership Defined" and asserting that
"an association of two or more persons to carry on a business for profit as owners creates a
partnership"). Note that the actual language of the statute says "creates," which conflicts with
the section's heading, which says "defined." Id. The language of the section preserves partner-
ship as a residual category but does not purport to limit the concept. Hillman cites numerous
unreported California cases in support of the idea that the partnership dissolves. See Hillman &
Weidner, supra note 92, at 455 n.12. However, California has a real definition of partnership, see
CAL. CORP. CODE § 16101(9) (West 2012). Hillman also cites an Idaho case, but the Idaho case
concludes that the joint venture at issue dissolved; the court reasoned that the joint venture was
not a partnership, which would have been governed by Idaho's partnership code, which, like
Texas's, is modeled on the Revised Uniform Partnership Act and declares a partnership an en-
tity. Hillman & Weidner, supra note 92, at 453 n.12 (citing Costa v. Borges, 179 P.3d 316, 319-20
(Idaho 2008)).
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remaining partner. Nick and Lorenzo sought to exclude Jerry for the
sake of the business. Leaving Jerry the business would accomplish the
opposite of their goal. Imposing that legal result on their conduct
would be contrary to their understanding and intent.
If the partnership terminates when Nick and Lorenzo withdraw,
leaving only one partner, then perhaps the partnership must wind-up.
In fact, partners in the position of Nick and Lorenzo could cause that
to happen regardless of whether a partnership continues as an entity
separate from its partners. Often, a partner expressing the will to
withdraw will request a winding up, and in that case,
an event requiring winding up of the partnership . . . occurs on the
60th day after the date on which the partnership receives notice of a
request for winding up the partnership from a partner, . . . unless a
majority-in-interest of the partners deny the request for winding up
or agree to continue the partnership. 94
Nick, Lorenzo, and Jerry were by default equal partners, so Nick and
Lorenzo could have required Jerry to wind up. They, not Jerry, are
the majority-in-interest. 95 Jerry would have no power to stop the
winding up.
But Nick and Lorenzo did not want a winding up. They wanted the
business to continue, and they wanted to run it. Several unfortunate
consequences would occur if locking Jerry out were held to constitute
Nick and Lorenzo's express withdrawal. First, as noted, because Nick
and Lorenzo would no longer be partners, Jerry would be the sole
remaining partner; therefore, Jerry would be in control of the business
for the moment.96 Even if the partnership will be wound up, "[a] part-
nership continues after an event of withdrawal" 97 "until the winding
up of its business is completed, at which time the partnership is termi-
nated." 98 "After the occurrence of an event requiring a winding up
... ,the partnership business may be wound up by ... the partners
who have not withdrawn . ... 99 During this time, Jerry, the remain-
ing partner, would be in control of the business and its assets.
Second, because withdrawing from the business would put Jerry in
control, locking Jerry out would constitute conversion of the partner-
94. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 11.057(d).
95. Majority-in-interest "means partners who own more than 50 percent of the current per-
centage or other interest in the profits of the partnership." Id. § 151.001(4). Because Nick,
Lorenzo, and Jerry had agreed to split profits equally, Monteleone v. Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d
1221, 1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), any two were a majority-in-interest. See TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE
ANN. § 152.002(a).
96. E.g., TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.704.
97. Id. § 152.502.
98. Id. § 152.701(a).
99. Id. § 152.702(a)(1).
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ship assets. In In re Leal,00 Leal, one of two partners in an auto glass
business, gave express notice of withdrawal from the general partner-
ship.10' Leal later obtained a judgment against his partner for prior
conversion of partnership assets.102 Leal's partner had been dis-
loyal,103 similarly to how Nick and Lorenzo alleged that Jerry was dis-
loyal. After expressly withdrawing, Leal changed the locks on the
doors.104 Perhaps Leal was afraid that his partner would convert more
partnership property. Nevertheless, the court held that "Leal's con-
duct was clearly wrongful. Once he withdrew from the partnership,
Leal did not have any right to control" its business. 105 The court held
Leal liable for conversion of partnership assets and for disloyalty as a
former agent of the partnership with lingering fiduciary duties. 106 A
court could hold that Nick and Lorenzo stand in the same position as
Leal.
Finally, if Nick and Lorenzo were held to have expressly withdrawn,
then at a wind-up, when partnership assets are sold,107 they would
have to bid against Jerry for the business. They might lose the bid-
ding. If the winding-up process and resulting litigation cause unbear-
able expense, the business might even be liquidated to pay creditors.
Nick and Lorenzo believed that, because they had done nothing
wrong but only acted to protect the business, they should be able to
continue and should not have to buy the business from Jerry. Obvi-
ously, a finding that Nick and Lorenzo had withdrawn is not an opti-
mal solution for them, and it is certainly not what they understood
would happen; it was not their intent. But it is an option for a court
on the facts of some self-help cases.
3. Expulsion
Obviously, Nick and Lorenzo were not trying to withdraw. They
were more likely trying to expel Jerry in order to protect the partner-
ship. Why not argue that locking Jerry out was his expulsion from the
partnership? The Texas Supreme Court, in Bohatch v. Butler & Bin-
100. In re Leal, 360 B.R. 231 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007). In re Leal was decided under the prior
partnership law, but the substance of the provisions has not changed with regard to the issues
discussed here. Id. at 235 n.1.
101. Id. at 240.
102. Id. at 237.
103. Id.
104. In re Leal, 360 B.R. at 240.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 240-41.
107. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 11.052, 152.703(a).
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ion,108 famously claimed that partners at will "have no duty to remain
partners."109 "A partnership exists solely because the partners choose
to place personal confidence and trust in one another."110 If that trust
is broken, the partnership is unlikely to remain a partnership.
It is possible to see Nick and Lorenzo's actions as an expulsion.
"An event of withdrawal of a partner occurs on . . . the partner's ex-
pulsion as provided by the partnership agreement[.]""' The code
clearly considers an expulsion possible. While the Rhue decision
opted not to find an expulsion in favor of the non-statutory "ouster"
(constituting withdrawal by express will of the ousting party),112 other
courts have found expulsion in self-help scenarios.
The clause in the code, however, contains the proviso "as provided
by the partnership agreement." In Bohatch, the partnership agree-
ment "contemplate[d] expulsion of a partner and prescribe[d] proce-
dures."11 3 But if the partnership agreement has no provision for
expulsion, then expulsion is a breach of the expelled partner's rights.
All the partners are, in a sense, "owners" of the partnership.114 Each
is also a manager."15 Each has a right to "use or possess partnership
property" for partnership purposes.116 One can easily understand
why, without a provision in the partnership agreement, locking a part-
ner out would violate the partner's rights.
In Young v. Qualls,117 Young financed a real estate development in
which Young and Qualls agreed to be partners." 8 Young bought the
property in the name of an LLC he owned.119 Qualls was to supervise
the clearing and development of the property and sell lots.120 The two
agreed to split profits after expenses were repaid with interest.121 No
108. Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998).
109. Id. at 544.
110. Id. at 546.
111. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.501(b)(3).
112. Rhue v. Dawson, 841 P.2d 215, 222 n.10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) ("Rhue was ousted rather
than expelled from the partnership. Expulsion of a partner can occur only if the partnership
agreement provides for such expulsion and the expulsion occurs according to the provisions of
the agreement. A.R.S. § 29-231(A)(4). In locking Rhue out of the partnership offices, Dawson
was not acting in accordance with the provisions of any agreement between Rhue and Dawson.
The partnership was, by that act, dissolved, and Rhue was ousted from the partnership.").
113. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 550 (Hecht, J, concurring).
114. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.501(b).
115. Id. § 152.203(a).
116. Id. § 152.203(b).
117. Young v. Qualls, 279 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. App. 2005).
118. Id. at 672.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 672, 674 n.3.
121. Id. at 672.
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sales occurred, however. After many months, and without consulting
Qualls, Young had the electricity turned off and telephone discon-
nected and asked Qualls to leave the property. 122 The jury found
Young had breached the partnership agreement. 123 The court of ap-
peals agreed, finding Young's "expulsion" of Qualls to be a violation
of Qualls's rights.124
A relatively ancient Texas case reflects the same position. In Ball v.
Britton,125 Ball and Britton agreed that Britton would furnish money
so that Ball could buy machinery and erect buildings that would serve
as an ice works, after which Ball would operate the business and the
two would split the profits.126 Ball supervised construction of the ice
works, opened the business in May 1879, and operated it successfully
for five months, making $3,000 net profits.127 The business appeared
to be a success, and Ball anticipated the ice works clearing $5,000
profit each year thereafter.128 However, on September 20, 1879, Brit-
ton excluded Ball from the premises "by threats to take his life, by
calling him a pauper, a liar and a thief and ordering one John P. Toli-
ver to knock his brains out if he attempted to superintend the busi-
ness."1 29 When Ball sued, Britton claimed that Britton had merely
withdrawn from the partnership,130 but the court held otherwise:
[T]hat is not the state of facts which the petition sets forth. The
defendant did not withdraw from the firm. He expelled the plaintiff
out of it; and he not only retained all that he had put into it, but he
kept all that had been contributed by the plaintiff, except a certain
portion of the profits.131
After finding that Britton had no right to expel Ball, the court held
that Ball could properly claim the value of his work and suggested
that punitive damages were also appropriate.132 "The defendant ap-
pears to have taken the law into his own hands, and to have closed the
partnership in a manner entirely too summary to be sanctioned by a
court of justice."' 33 If the court saw the facts that way, a court could
hold that Nick and Lorenzo had treated Jerry as Britton treated Ball.
122. Young, 279 S.W.3d at 672.
123. Id. at 673.
124. Id. at 673-75.
125. Ball v. Britton, 58 Tex. 57 (Tex. 1882).
126. Id. at 57.
127. Id. at 57-58.
128. Id. at 58.
129. Id.
130. Ball, 58 Tex. at 60-62.
131. Id. at 62.
132. Id. at 62-63.
133. Id. at 63.
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Even large law firms get this wrong, sometimes. In Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft v. Beasley,134 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft
("Cadwalader"), a large law partnership, sent a notice to partners in
its Palm Beach, Florida office that the firm intended to close the of-
fice.135 Beasley, a Palm Beach partner, hired Professor Robert Hill-
man to send Cadwalader an opinion that Cadwalader had no
authority to expel Beasley.136 Cadwalader, it seems, did not have a
partnership agreement clause providing for expulsion of partners.
Cadwalader sent a notice repenting, but then it offered Beasley a
Hobson's choice between relocation to New York or D.C. or volun-
tary withdrawal from the partnership.'37 Beasley complained that this
was equivalent to expulsion.'38 A court eventually agreed.139 Leaving
for New York or D.C. "would have severely diminished his rainmak-
ing abilities. Under these circumstances, . . . his rejecting the offer as
impractical was not tantamount to a voluntary withdrawal."1 40 The
legal upshot, said the court, was that the firm "anticipatorily expelled
Beasley."a41
The story continues, however. After turning down this "choice,"
Beasley sued the firm for breach of fiduciary duty, and, in response,
Cadwalader sent a letter purporting to expel Beasley.142 The court
held that this was expulsion even if the false choice was not.143 The
court allowed Beasley to recover for "wrongful expulsion"144 and
breach of fiduciary duties.145 Beasley was able to recover punitive
damages for the firm's "conscious[ ] disregard[]" of his rights.146
Young, Ball, and Beasley are not the only cases in this line.147
134. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft v. Beasley, 728 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). A
wonderful discussion of Cadwalader appears in Allan W. Vestal, "Assume a Rather Large Boat
. .. : The Mess We Have Made of Partnership Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487 (1997) and
Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty, 54 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 877
(1997).
135. Cadwalader, 728 So. 2d at 255.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 256.
140. Cadwalader, 728 So. 2d at 256.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 255-56.
143. Id. at 256.
144. Id. at 255, 257.
145. Cadwalader, 728 So. 2d at 258-59.
146. Id. at 259.
147. See, e.g., Norber v. Marcotte, 134 S.W.3d 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming an award of
punitive damages for, inter alia, locking out a partner and misappropriating funds).
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Did Nick and Lorenzo expel Jerry in conscious disregard of his
rights? It is clear that they had no more an express provision in their
partnership agreement authorizing expulsion than did Young and
Qualls, Britton and Ball, or Cadwalader. If they had no right to expel,
they risked offending Jerry's rights by locking him out of the auto
body shop, just as Young offended Qualls's, Britton offended Ball's,
and Cadwalader offended Beasley's. The jury would be welcome to
make such a finding on these facts.
Nick and Lorenzo would not only be paying damages for offending
Jerry's rights as a partner. The Texas General Partnership Law also
requires that Jerry, as a withdrawn partner, be bought out. "The part-
nership interest of a withdrawn partner automatically is redeemed by
the partnership as of the date of withdrawal . . 148 The redemption
price for Jerry's interest is "the fair value of the interest on the date of
withdrawal." 149 A contrasting section suggests that "fair value" in-
cludes goodwill, i.e., that "fair value" is going concern value: A part-
ner who wrongfully withdraws is entitled only to "the lesser of .. . fair
value [or] . .. the amount that the withdrawn partner would have re-
ceived if an event requiring a winding up of partnership business had
occurred at the time of the partner's withdrawal."150 Fair value versus
liquidation value-the contrast shows that fair value normally would
include the value of a going business. That is what Nick and Lorenzo
would owe Jerry if their locking him out were construed as an expul-
sion in violation of Jerry's rights, as per Cadwalader.
B. A Contractual Solution: Monteleone1'5
1. Monteleone and the Code: Might the Answer Be No?
In contrast to other courts' focus on Nick and Lorenzo's changing of
the locks, the Monteleone decision focused instead on the offending
conduct of Jerry-the reason the locks were changed. As with the
other cases mentioned in this Article, Monteleone was decided under
an older statute, the Uniform Partnership Act (1914),152 but the case's
reasoning is just as consistent or inconsistent with that statute as it
would be with the current Texas General Partnership Law.
148. TEx. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.601 (2013).
149. Id. § 152.602(a).
150. Id. § 152.602(b).
151. Monteleone v. Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d 1221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
152. Id. at 1224.
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Briefly put, the Monteleone court declared that Jerry's conduct con-
stituted a wrongful withdrawal from the partnership.153 The court's
reasoning appears in the following passage:
[I]nnocent partners have the right to continue partnership business
where another partner has wrongfully terminated the
partnership....
A partner's conduct is considered "wrongful" when it is taken in
derogation of the duties imposed either explicitly by the partnership
agreement or implicitly by virtue of the nature of the partnership
itself. The Uniform Partnership Act empowers a court to order
partnership dissolution whenever, for example, a "partner has been
guilty of such conduct as tends to affect prejudicially the carrying on
of the business, [or whenever a] partner wilfully [sic] or persistently
commits a breach of the partnership or agreement . . .
In our opinion these allegations [of Jerry's conduct] . . . were suffi-
cient to state a claim that Jerry's behavior was in contravention of
the partnership agreement or a breach of Jerry's fiduciary duties,
and would amount to "wrongful termination" of the partnership.154
This passage seems inconsistent with the 1914 UPA in several ways,
two of which are relevant here. 55 First, in the UPA, breach of the
partnership agreement or breach of fiduciary duties is not itself a with-
drawal or dissolution of the partnership within the statute.156 The
structure of the UPA's dissolution and termination provisions strongly
suggests that, in a partnership at will-meaning without "a definite
153. Id. at 1224-25.
154. Id. (citing, inter alia, Uniform Partnership Act § 32 (1914), as enacted in Illinois law at
the time) (citations omitted).
155. In addition to the two sections discussed here, the court also applies section 38(2) and (3)
as a remedy in an at-will partnership, something the statute almost surely did not contemplate.
Section 38(2) was to apply only to a partnership for a definite term or particular undertaking,
which is why it authorizes the remaining partners to continue the business only "during the
agreed term." See U.P.A. § 38(2)(b) (1914). The Monteleone court finessed this issue by claim-
ing that "the term originally agreed upon by the partners" was "at will." 497 N.E.2d at 1225.
156. See, e.g., U.P.A. § 31 (1914) (Causes of Dissolution). The UPA uses the term dissolution
to describe the end of the partnership, which is described as "an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." U.P.A. § 6(1) (1914). The partnership is
thought of primarily as an aggregate or group of partners. When the partners are no longer
associated together in that fashion, then the association that is the partnership is at an end. The
business may go on under a different partnership (for instance, an association of the remaining
partners), or may be wound up, depending on other circumstances. See, e.g., U.P.A. §§ 37-38
(1914). The code treats winding up as a separate issue. Our code now reaches similar results
through a different logic. The primary difference is that the partnership is treated as an entity.
See TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.056 (2013). A partner may withdraw from the partner-
ship, but the entity remains and continues to own the business. See id. §§ 152.501, 152.502. The
business may go on, or the entity and business may be wound up and terminated, depending on
circumstances other than the withdrawal of a partner. See id. § 152.701.
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term or particular undertaking specified in the [partnership] agree-
ment"157-since no cause for dissolution is necessary, no cause for dis-
solution is relevant other than the will of the withdrawing partner.
The sufficiency of a partner's expressed will to dissolve renders irrele-
vant the partners' reasons for dissolution; the law cares only that the
partner wants to dissolve, not why.'58 The at-will nature of the part-
nership suggests that no legally recognized dissolution for cause exists.
The same is true under the current Texas General Partnership Law.
In a partnership at will, any expressed will to withdraw received by the
partnership functions as a withdrawal,159 and such a withdrawal is not
wrongful under the statute.160 This implies, as under the UPA, that
the reasons for an expression of withdrawal are irrelevant. Under the
facts in Monteleone, it was clear (and the court itself admitted)161 that
the partnership was at will. Therefore, the only issue under the code
was whether Jerry had expressed the will to dissolve. Of course, he
had not. Rather, he had complained that Nick and Lorenzo had
wrongfully excluded him, "thereby effecting a dissolution."162 Jerry
asked for the right to continue the business as the remaining owner.
At no time until he sued did he express the will to disassociate; nor
had Nick and Lorenzo, except to exclude Jerry, and the code suggests
their reasons for doing so were technically irrelevant. Thus, no disso-
lution, disassociation, or withdrawal occurred.
Second, and conversely, the Monteleone court suggested that the
section providing for dissolution by decree of court supports its analy-
sis. To justify concluding that Jerry had wrongfully dissolved the part-
nership, the court cited the dissolution by judicial decree provision,
UPA section 32, which provides that, on the proper showing, "the
court shall decree a dissolution." 163 The court's argument is a bit of a
stretch. If the law meant for the conduct of a partner to cause dissolu-
tion, why must the court enter a decree? Is the result in Monteleone a
"Dissolution by Decree of Court," as section 32's heading proclaims,
or dissolution by egregious conduct, as the Monteleone court's reason-
157. U.P.A. § 31(1)(a) (1914) (defining an at-will partnership as a partnership without "defi-
nite term or particular undertaking specified in the [partnership] agreement").
158. See, e.g., id. §§ 31, 32, 38. Under section 31, dissolution is caused "[w]ithout violation of
the agreement between the partners" by the expression of a partner's will to dissolve. Premise: a
partner may withdraw without any wrongdoing merely by expressing the will to disassociate,
without any cause at all; conclusion: having a cause to disassociate adds nothing-the law is not
concerned with cause for disassociation in an at-will partnership.
159. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.501(b).
160. See id. § 152.503.
161. Monteleone v. Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
162. Id. at 1223.
163. U.P.A. § 32 (1914).
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ing suggests? If egregious conduct alone causes disassociation, one
would need to file for a decree only when there was a dispute about
whether such conduct had occurred, and the "decree of dissolution"
would be a mere finding of fact, not a judicial order decreeing dissolu-
tion. What the court did is not a natural reading of section 32.
The Texas General Partnership Law may seem equally opposed to
Monteleone for the same reason. In the Texas provision, egregious
conduct that under the UPA warranted a judicial decree of dissolution
even more clearly requires a judicial decree: "An event of withdrawal
of a partner occurs on: . . . (5) the partner's expulsion by judicial de-
gree, on application by the partnership or another partner, if the judi-
cial decree determines that the partner [committed the egregious
conduct]." 164 Thus, the expulsion, which is the event of withdrawal,
occurs by judicial decree, not by a partner's conduct. And the decree
is conditioned on both a petition by a proper party and a proper find-
ing. It would be difficult to cite this section alone in support of a hold-
ing that a partner's misconduct had caused the partner's withdrawal
long before the decree occurred.
As noted, Texas law also purports to take control of the definition
of "wrongful": "A partner's withdrawal is wrongful only if: (1) the
withdrawal breaches an express provision of the partnership agree-
ment; (2) ... [the partnership] has a period of duration, is for a partic-
ular undertaking," or is required to wind up on the occurrence of a
certain event, and one of these occurs; or "(3) the partner is expelled
by judicial decree under Section 152.501(b)(5)." 165 Of course, none of
these happened in Monteleone. There was no express partnership
agreement, the partnership was at will, and there had been no decree.
So, under the Texas General Partnership Law's provisions, Jerry might
not have withdrawn, and even if he had, the withdrawal was not
wrongful. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) largely
agrees.166
On the other hand, Texas case law includes a version of Monteleone,
reasoned with equal obscurity: M.R. Champion, Inc. v. Mizell.167 The
case is pre-Texas General Partnership Law, but, given the incongrui-
ties between these cases and any partnership code, that should not be
164. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.501(b)(5).
165. Id. § 152.503(b).
166. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act agrees with this result, as a matter of default
terms. See, e.g., R.U.P.A. 22 §§ 601, 801 (2001); HILLMAN, WEIDNER & DONN, supra note 23, at
429 ("Assuming the partnership agreement does not provide for expulsion by action of the part-
nership, the aggrieved partner's options are limited to seeing judicial expulsion under Section
601(5) or petitioning for a decree of dissolution under Section 801(5).").
167. M.R. Champion, Inc. v. Mizell, 904 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
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a strike against or for the case. In M.R. Champion, Mizell and Cham-
pion formed a partnership to provide services to Northwestern Re-
sources Co. for one year, beginning in January 1986.168 Near the end
of 1986, Champion negotiated a second year for the partnership in the
name of his own company. 169 However, in January 1987, Northwest-
ern banned Mizell from its property.170 Champion continued to per-
form, using equipment leased from Mizell. 171 In December 1987,
Champion negotiated an additional three-year contract, again in the
name of his own company.172 One month later, he told Mizell the
partnership was at an end.'7 3
Mizell sued Champion for the profits of the additional three
years.174 In defense, Champion claimed that the partnership termi-
nated in January of 1987 when Northwestern banned Mizell from its
property.175 Mizell claimed that the partnership continued until
Champion terminated it in January 1988.176 The jury "found that after
Mizell was barred from Northwestern's premises in January 1987, he
breached the partnership agreement and conducted himself in such a
way that it was not reasonably practicable to carry on the partnership
business."177 Therefore, the trial court found that the partnership was
terminated in January 1987, a finding-and interpretation of partner-
ship law-that the Texas Supreme Court affirmed in a per curiam
opinion.178
Squaring this case with the Texas General Partnership Law, at least
superficially, is a difficult task.179 The only event that occurred in Jan-
uary 1987 is that Mizell was banned from Northwestern's property.
This was neither the expression of a partner's will to withdraw nor a
judicial decree of withdrawal. This event did fit into one legally rele-
vant category: conduct such that "it was not reasonably practicable to
carry on [the] partnership business." 80 This language appears in the
code only in the justification for a judicial decree of expulsion, how-
168. Id. at 617.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. M.R. Champion, 904 S.W.2d at 617.
173. Id. at 617-18.
174. Id. at 618.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. M.R. Champion, 904 S.W.2d at 618.
178. Id. at 618-19.
179. But not impossible. It is in fact the task undertaken in Section Ill.B of this paper.
180. M.R. Champion, 904 S.W.2d at 618.
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ever.181 The code does not make such conduct on its own an event of
withdrawal. The code alone, read this way, does not appear to justify
the court's decision in this case.
The court also held that Mizell had "breached the partnership
agreement."1 82 The statute names this as cause for a judicial expul-
sion.183 It is easy to see why Mizell's conduct satisfied this category.
If a partner makes himself so odious to the partnership's only client-
whom the partnership was formed to serve-that the client bans the
partner from the client's property, the conduct is clearly contrary to
the partners' understanding of acceptable behavior in the conduct of
the business. Indeed, such behavior is contrary to the conduct of any
business for profit. Yet the judicial expulsion provision of the code
seems to give little support to the court's declaration that Mizell's con-
duct was itself a withdrawal.
2. The Case for Informal Partnerships and Self-Help
Counter-arguments in favor of the Monteleone/M.R. Champion
type of opinion exist, however. These arguments are more substan-
tive. They are also equally logical. Moreover, they do not appear to
be opposed by the code. In several ways, the code supports them,
though perhaps not obviously.
First, regarding wrongfulness: expulsion by judicial decree for mis-
conduct is wrongful withdrawal,18 4 presumably because the miscon-
duct itself is wrongful; it is not the judge's actions the statute declares
wrongful. Yet if conduct that supports a judicial expulsion warrants a
declaration of wrongfulness, then it was wrongful conduct even before
the judicial decree. 85
Moreover, if such conduct warrants judicial expulsion at the time of
the decree, presumably it warrants a finding of withdrawal; that is, in
fact, what the statute declares it warrants. And if it warrants a finding
of withdrawal, then cannot it also be, or cause, a withdrawal? To say
that the withdrawal comes only on the court's decree prohibits the
court from doing justice from the time of the wrong done, as if com-
mission of a tort depended on a decree that the conduct was wrongful.
If that were true, damages should flow only from the date of the de-
181. TEx. Bus. OiRs. CoiE ANN. § 152.501(b)(5)(C) (2013).
182. M.R. Champion, 904 S.W.2d at 618.
183. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CouE ANN. § 152.501(b)(5)(B).
184. Id. § 152.503(b)(3).
185. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act likewise uses the word "wrongful" inconsistently.
See HILLMAN, WEIDNER & DONN, supra note 23, at 425-26 ("Unfortunately, R.U.P.A. is not
entirely consistent in its use of the term wrongful. . . . By sometimes using 'wrongful' very pre-
cisely and at other times using it more loosely, R.U.P.A. is likely to cause much confusion.").
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cree. The partnership code itself does not understand that to happen
when withdrawal is wrongful.186 And cases decreeing the equivalent
of withdrawal under older statutes took account of this conundrum by
decreeing withdrawal to have occurred not on the date of the decree
but on the date of the misconduct. 87
Nor does the code make itself the exclusive arbiter of withdrawal
events. While section 152.001 provides that "'[e]vent of withdrawal"
or "withdrawal" means an event specified by Section 152.501(b),"1 88
and 152.501(a) proclaims that "[a] person ceases to be a partner on
the occurrence of an event of withdrawal,"' 89 nothing in the statute
claims these to be the only or exclusive means of ceasing to be a part-
ner.190 Moreover, the statute invites the parties to expand withdrawal
events by contract, and invites courts to recognize such provisions.
Section 152.501(b)(2) includes "an event specified in the partnership
agreement as causing the partner's withdrawal."19 1 And the general
expulsion provision of 152.501(b)(3) allows expulsion "as provided by
the partnership agreement."1 92 The limits on contractual modifica-
tions of the default partnership withdrawal provisions prohibit a con-
tract to "vary the power to withdraw as a partner under section
152.501(b)(1), (7), or (8),"193 but a partner's power to withdraw under
those sections is not varied by the contractual addition of other with-
drawal methods. The same section limits the power to "vary the right
to expel a partner by a court in an event specified by section
152.501(b)(5),"1 94 but the right of a court to expel is not varied when a
court in addition declares that the partner herself withdrew by com-
186. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.503(c) (specifying that "a wrongfully withdrawing
partner is liable to the partnership and to the other partners for damages caused by the with-
drawal," with no mention of the decree as a limiting date).
187. See Vangel v. Vangel, 254 P.2d 919, 926 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) ("In some cases where the
breach is serious and unequivocal the dissolution may be decreed as of the date of the breach."
(dicta)); HILLMAN, WEIDNER & DONN, supra note 23, at 416-17 ("Nothing in R.U.P.A. reveals
an intent to change prior case law, which suggests flexibility to fix a date of separate to suit the
circumstances of a given case. Accordingly, the effective date of disassociation by judicial expul-
sion may be the date of conduct or circumstances giving rise to the decree . . . ."); see also Fisher
v. Fisher, 212 N.E.2d 222, 224 (Mass. 1965) (holding the partner guilty of misconduct and a
victim of wrongful ouster but undeserving of any profits from the partnership after the date of
the ouster and declaring the partnership dissolved on the date of the ouster, "nunc pro tunc").
188. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.001 (1) (emphasis added).
189. Id. § 152.501(a) ("A person ceases to be a partner on the occurrence of an event of
withdrawal.")
190. Cf, e.g., HILLMAN, WEIDNER & DONN, supra note 23, at 420 ("[Section 601] itself does
not specify that the list of dissociation events is exclusive.").
191. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CoDE ANN. § 152.501(b)(2).
192. Id. § 152.501(b)(3).
193. Id. § 152.002(b)(5).
194. Id. § 152.002(b)(6).
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mitting misconduct that would itself warrant expulsion by the court.
In other words, the code does not prevent contractual additions to any
of the sections relevant to withdrawal in these cases. The events speci-
fied in section 152.501 are thus not the only possible means of
withdrawal.
Courts should therefore be open to arguments based on contract or
agreement. Partnership is a contractual relationship. While it is com-
mon to refer to the provisions of the partnership code that control
partnerships in the absence of agreement as default provisions, the
code actually makes the partnership agreement the first source for
rules governing partnership: "To the extent that the partnership agree-
ment does not otherwise provide, this chapter and the other partner-
ship provisions govern the relationship of the partners and between
the partners and the partnership." 195 So, technically, only if the part-
ners' agreement does not solve the issue do the provisions of the code
become defaults. Analysis of partnership begins in contract.
While "partnership" is a default category that can be applied even
to persons not intending to be partners,196 the acts that persons must
do to become partners are all contractual in nature. A partnership
can form only between persons who have some kind of contract, even
if very informal.197 At a minimum, they must agree to associate to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit.198 "Factors indicating that
persons have created a partnership" are all contractually obtained:
''receipt or right to receive a share of profits," "participation or right
to participate in control of the business," "agreement to share or shar-
ing" of losses or liabilities, and "agreement to contribute or contribut-
ing money or property to the business."1 99 The one qualification
necessary to be a partner is "capacity apart from" the partnership
code, meaning, presumably, contractual capacity.200 And most of the
provisions in the Texas General Partnership Law are default provi-
sions; except in a few named instances, "a partnership agreement gov-
erns the relations of the partners and between the partners and the
partnership." 201
195. Id. § 152.002(a).
196. TEx. Bus. ORGS. CoDE ANN. § 152.051(b).
197. City of Corpus Christi v. Bayfront Assocs., 814 S.W.2d 98, 107 (Tex. App. 1991) ("This
relationship must be based on an agreement, either expressed or implied.").
198. Id.
199. TrX. Bus. ORGS. CoDEr ANN. § 152.052(a). Of course, it is possible that such rights are
given by gift or devise, but that would be the rare exception.
200. Id. § 152.053. Cf id. § 3.004(a) (declaring capacity to contract the sole qualification for
organizing a filing entity).
201. Id. § 152.002(a).
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The legal result of formation of a partnership contract is that, unless
displaced by the partnership code, contract law also applies. The
Texas General Partnership Law is quite clear that "principles of law
and equity ... supplement" the law "unless otherwise provided."202 It
would be remarkable if contract law did not apply. And principles of
equity have always played a role in partnership break-up law.203
If partnership is a contract, then partners may establish the terms of
that contract by manifesting their intentions, expressly or by implica-
tion.204 The terms of that contract must necessarily be examined in a
broad-minded way. The Texas General Partnership Law is intended
to govern partnerships, but partnerships are an extraordinarily broad
category of business relationships. On the continua of resources, so-
phistication, and size of business, for instance, on one end reside giant
law firms, construction companies, and investment vehicles served by
legions of lawyers, bankers, accountants, and other advisors. On the
other end of those continua are backhoe contractors, plumbers, and
landscapers, many of whom fall into the partnership category by de-
fault. If this latter group has an explicit partnership agreement, it is
oral, 205 and it may be nothing more explicit than an agreement to split
profits.206 They might never have profits, but if they agree to split
them, contribute roughly equally to the business, and by their conduct
obviously share control, they are likely to be found partners.207 This
kind of informal partnership is just as much a partnership as the large
202. Id. § 152.003.
203. See, e.g., Sanders v. Kirkland & Co., 510 So. 2d 138, 140-41 (Ala. 1987) ("The law of
Alabama has historically and consistently treated any claim of 'wrongful exclusion' from a part-
nership as being a purely equitable claim."); Cagnolatti v. Guinn, 189 Cal. Rptr. 151, 155 (Cal.
App. 1983) (naming a partner following dissolution by expulsion the equivalent of a trust benefi-
ciary); Gherman v. Colburn, 140 Cal. Rptr. 330, 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Owen v. Wilden Hosp.,
62 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1954) (equity action for accounting and dissolution for alleged wrongful
expulsion); Schoenborn v. Schoenborn, 402 N.W.2d 212, 214-15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Herman
v. Pepper, 166 A. 587, 588 (Pa. 1933) ("The exclusion of one partner by another from the man-
agement of the partnership business or possession of the partnership property is undoubtedly
ground for dissolution by a court of equity.").
204. "[A] partnership agreement governs the relations of the partners and between the part-
ners and the partnership." TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.002(a) (2013). See, e.g., Bailey &
Williams v. Westfall, 727 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. App. 1987) ("Where there is a partnership agree-
ment, . . . the rights of a withdrawing partner are governed by that agreement, not by statute.");
Dobson v. Dobson, 594 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tex. App. 1980) ("[The partnership agreement] gov-
erns the rights of the partners; only where it is silent do the provisions of the [statute] come into
play.").
205. Oral partnership agreements are common. See, e.g., Johnson v. Graze Out Cattle Co.,
2012 WL 2923329 (Tex. App. 2012); Malone v. Patel, 397 S.W.3d 658, 674-75 (Tex. App. 2012)
(finding evidence to support a finding of partnership in an oral agreement and opining that
"[t]he law recognizes oral agreements"); Sewing v. Bowman, 371 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. App. 2012).
206. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.052(a)(1) (2013).
207. See id. § 152.052(a).
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law firm that intentionally chooses the business form. Identical code
provisions, however, potentially have wildly different economic and
moral effects on such partnerships and on the incentives of people
who form them.
The Beasley case,208 on the one hand, and Monteleone209 and M.R.
Champion210 on the other, provide good examples. When Cadwala-
der, Wickersham & Taft, the large law firm, discovers that it lacks an
expulsion provision in its partnership agreement and therefore has vi-
olated partner Beasley's rights,211 most of us are apt to laugh. If the
wisdom of the high-falootin' Manhattan firm is not enough to plan for
dissatisfaction with a small Florida office, the firm has no one to
blame but itself. Society rightly places the moral responsibility for
planning for withdrawals on the central management of the large law
firm, which has resources and the know-how to draft a nuanced agree-
ment of all partners in advance. Moreover, the sums at issue in an
expulsion from this successful practice justify even a CW&T lawyer's
time to draft the required provisions.
But when two fellows team up to buy a bulldozer and push earth for
people around the county,212 no one expects them to plan for their
eventual dissatisfaction with each other. 213 Few small, close business-
people decide to start a business as co-owners and share management
decisions day-to-day while at the same time holding in their heads a
plan for the termination of their relationship. Not only does no one
blame the partners for not calling a lawyer to organize their business,
the damages from a wrongful expulsion multiplied by the probability
of an explosive break-up were probably far less than the fee they
would have had to pay the lawyer to draft the clause. They and their
neighbors might laugh at them for paying a lawyer for such things, and
they would probably be right to do so. In that case, writing such a
contract would be inefficient. Given the hopefulness of the parties in
their undertaking, planning for its demise often seems immoral to
them, though they may and often do each have well-defined expecta-
tions regarding the conditions on which they are to do business.
These are types or paradigms that I am describing, but they make
obvious that when we talk of the agreement of the partners, and their
relationship, we are talking about different problems depending on
208. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft v. Beasley, 728 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
209. Monteleone v. Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d 1221, 1223 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
210. M.R. Champion, Inc. v. Mizell, 904 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
211. Cadwalader, 728 So. 2d at 255-56.
212. Nolen v. Burnett, No. CA91-151, 1992 WL 16080 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992).
213. The parties appeared not to have done so. Id. *2-4 (reporting the partners' very infor-
mal negotiations).
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the kind of partnership at issue. How the law governs such relation-
ships might differ. For instance, when the law chooses a default rule,
often it is best to choose the rule that the parties would have chosen
had they negotiated it, or at least something close to it, if that can be
determined. 214 In this way, the law lowers transaction costs: It is
cheaper to form a business when the form itself already contains the
rule we would expect to govern us. 215
Sometimes, the law chooses an intentionally inefficient rule: a de-
fault rule which is not the rule the parties would have chosen had they
had time to negotiate.216 The rule penalizes parties who do not bar-
gain away from it, so some call this kind of rule a "penalty default." 2 1 7
We might choose this rule if we have no idea what the parties would
choose, we wish to encourage them to choose something, and we think
that a desirable enough number of them will take notice and contract
around the default. If all the relevant parties are sophisticated and
have the means to negotiate around the penalty, then such a rule
might result in better law-economically, morally, and prudentially-
because it will be chosen by the parties.
What must be avoided, however, is the imposition of a penalty de-
fault rule on parties who are unlikely to know that they should negoti-
ate away from it, or lack the means or incentive to negotiate away
from it, or reasonably believe that the law does not seek to penalize
them if they fail to negotiate. A penalty default in such a case is un-
economical, immoral, and unjust.
With regard to the self-help problem, the kind of partnership at is-
sue is almost always the small, informal kind. Those who have the
sophistication, means, and reason to get a lawyer involved early often
do. The three fellows at the Monte Auto Body Shop either lacked the
sophistication or the means to do so, or perhaps the costs of it would
214. This is a kind of majoritarian default rule but is tailored to the parties' views. See, e.g.,
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608,
613-17 (1998) (providing a lucid description of the foundational literature); see also Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). A "tailored default" rule, which "attempts to provide a contract's par-
ties with precisely 'what they would have contracted for,"' on the one hand, differs from an
"untailored default," which "provides the parties to all contracts with a single, off-the-rack stan-
dard that in some sense represents what the majority of contracting parties would want." Ayres
& Robert, supra note 214, at 91.
215. See Korobkin, supra note 214, at 615; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 214, at 93 ("The
'would have wanted' approach to gap filling is a natural out-growth of the transaction cost expla-
nation of contractual incompleteness.").
216. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 214, at 94-95 (developing one theory for when the
law should choose a penalty default rule).
217. Id. at 91.
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have outweighed the benefits. Perhaps adding the lawyer's expenses
to their bottom line would change its color from black to red. Perhaps
they have acted quite reasonably, in context, and believed the law
would back them up. The rule that applies to their conduct probably
should in fact back them up. It should not be a penalty default.
Rather, it should reflect their reasonable expectations.
Courts should be on the lookout to protect the reasonable expecta-
tions of the partners developed within their relationship. When courts
adjudicate disputes between partners in small, informal partnerships
as to their rights against each other-in other words, issues about the
meaning of their relationship-the reasonable expectations of the
partners in context is a better guide to their agreement, a more moral
guide as to the proper result, and a more economically sensible rule
for small, informal partnerships in the future-than any other rule.
The reasonable expectations of the partners is, in fact, the partnership
agreement, as much as the written partnership agreement of CW&T
was theirs.
It must and should be so. These small, informal partnerships have
very little in the way of explicit agreement. They may have agreed
only to split profits, though that explicit agreement may have been a
key component of a court's conclusion that they have become part-
ners. But no one would claim that the entire agreement of the part-
ners in an ongoing business is captured in the single phrase "to split
profits." Running a business is a complicated endeavor. Looking at
what the partners have done, and how they have done it over the time
the business operated, will reveal a great deal more about what they
have actually agreed, and what they reasonably expect for the future.
This understanding, which shapes the partners' thinking and conduct,
should shape the rules that bind the partners when their relationship
unravels.
In fact, a careful look at all of this conduct is how courts determine
in the first instance that an informal, default partnership exists.218 The
analysis is typically factored, contextual, closely tailored to the parties'
understanding, and based on a broad factual analysis.219 The law
would be oddly incongruous if it looked at all of this conduct to deter-
mine that a partnership exists and then ignored it all and applied only
218. See, e.g., Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 893-904 (Tex. 2009); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN,
supra note 5, ch. 2.
219. That Bromberg and Ribstein take an entire chapter to detail partnership formation is a
testament to the complexity and particularity of the analysis. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra
note 5, ch. 2. The chapter contains broad sections on the context of the determination, id.
§ 2.02; the requisite intent, id. § 2.05; and the factors that must be examined, id. §§ 2.06-2.09.
The authors include a section on formalities, also. Id. § 2.13.
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explicit code-determined default rules in determining how the same
partnership should cease.
When such partnerships come to an end, firmly established case law
sometimes looks to this same pattern of conduct to determine the le-
gal parameters of partnership termination. A long line of cases ad-
dress whether a partnership is at will or for a definite term or
particular undertaking.220 The line between the two is not clear,221
and only an examination of the facts showing the partners' under-
standing will allow a court to say. Occasionally, a court might even
allow that informal understanding to conflict with the formal partner-
ship agreement. 222 Courts have not been hesitant to look.
Looking to this informal understanding might also, just as well, sug-
gest what counts as withdrawal from a partnership 223 or when the
partners have a right to expel one of their members.224 Sticking to the
partners' agreement, even such an informal one as this, will encourage
others (including the parties in dispute) to begin business in the future
on the strength of their own reasonable expectations. If when small
businesses begin to fall apart nothing that the parties reasonably ex-
pected to happen happens, then the next time around some will just
not start the business. At the margins, the costs of beginning some
businesses will be too high, and they will never begin. We will all be
the poorer for it.
In the self-help context, then, the rules that apply to informal part-
nerships should not penalize the parties' reasonable understanding.
220. See supra note 6; see also, e.g., BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, § 7.02(c)(3).
221. HILLMAN, WEIDNER & DONN, supra note 23, at 428-29 ("A substantial body of case law
has developed under the U.P.A. concerning implied agreements that establish terms or under-
takings.... [T]he U.P.A. decisions will be relevant in determining whether a term or undertak-
ing should be inferred for a R.U.P.A. partnership.").
222. In Bendalin v. Youngblood & Assocs., 381 S.W.3d 719 (Tex. App. 2012), a written part-
nership agreement appeared to require a written withdrawal. notice. A partner expressed his
intent to withdraw orally, and the court held this effective notwithstanding the agreement's re-
quiring of a writing. 381 S.W.3d at 736. The statute's "provisions do not state that oral notice is
ineffective if the notice is not received in writing where required," the court reasoned. Id. at 737.
"To hold otherwise would require this Court to overlook the practical implications of a partner's
actual departure from a partnership." Id.
223. See, e.g., BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, § 7.02(c)(4) ("Sometimes it is unclear
whether a partner acted with intent to dissolve . . . .").
224. An expulsion provision can be a part of an oral partnership agreement. See Frank v.
R.A. Pickens & Son Co., 572 S.W.2d 133 (Ark. 1978); Hogan v. Morton, No. 03A01-9206-CH-
00214, 1993 WL 64220, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that a question of fact existed re-
garding whether a partner could be expelled from a law firm partnership pursuant to agreement
based on prior practices); see also Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 439 n.1 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990) (allowing parol evidence of the partners' agreement because "this partnership
[agreement] is not integrated").
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Rather, they should reach the most efficient result, the one that con-
firms the reasonable assumptions of the partners.
Again, the code allows this flexibility. In the Texas General Part-
nership Law, the relevant default statutory provisions of partnership
law are equivalent to default contractual terms only after we look first
to the partners to discern their agreement.225 So a court may deter-
mine-as the Monteleone and M.R. Champion courts did-the terms
of the partnership agreement or the nature of the partnership, based
on the parties' understanding and conduct, standard usage, and finally
statutory default rules. This rationale supports what those courts did.
The code itself mentions the possibility of contractual withdrawal
terms when it refers, as noted above, 226 to "an event specified in the
partnership agreement as causing the partner's withdrawal." 227 On
first glance, the word "specified" seems to require a measure of for-
mality, and one might think that partners in informal partnerships
could never reach it. But the law that governs informal business rela-
tionships is not and should not be so biased against informal business
relationships.228 Though the word "specified" seems to suggest the
thing is expressed, some ways of violating an informal relationship are
so obvious that they specify themselves. For example, in M.R. Cham-
pion, the informal promise violated was to remain able to serve our
partnership's only business client, a promise violated when partner
Mizell was permanently banned from that client's property.229 In
Monteleone, the partnership relationship (and explicit oral promises)
required that each partner take an equal weekly draw, a term Jerry
violated.230 The partnership relationship was also based on a govern-
ance structure of three equal votes, a structure that would be upset by
Jerry's bringing his son in as a partner. 231 Jerry's combined miscon-
duct would break the implicit trust required in such a small business.
One could readily imagine circumstances other than M.R. Cham-
pion and Monteleone that would qualify. The paradigmatic example
might be the maniacally destructive partner. Suppose a law partner-
ship has three partners (A, B, and C) and three offices (1, 2, and 3).
225. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.002(a) (2013).
226. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
227. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.501(b)(2).
228. Hillman addressed a similar concern when he reasoned that failure of informal partners
to agree on an expulsion provision should also not be held against them. Hillman, supra note 39,
at 543. He reasoned, "The absence of an expulsion agreement . . . may represent nothing more
than a failure of the partners to consider the possibility of such an arrangement." Id.
229. M.R. Champion, Inc. v. Mizell, 904 S.w.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
230. Monteleone v. Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
231. Id.
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One night, office 3 burns to the ground. Partner C calls in the next
morning claiming he is traumatized and will not be at work. On secur-
ity recordings recovered later that day at 4:30 pm, partners A and B
see partner C spreading gasoline throughout office 3 and lighting a
match. They immediately change the locks to offices 1 and 2 and em-
ploy guards to secure those offices. Have they offended partner C's
rights? Surely an implied promise in their agreement and relationship
is that none of them will actively destroy the business. The law does
not need this promise to be more expressly specified. In these circum-
stances, self-help appears to be the only reasonable response. In other
words, if one looks at the actual circumstances of these partnerships,
one sees that the partners' understanding was specific enough that
every partner knew that, if he acted in a certain way, the partnership
was largely pointless to continue, that it was going to end.
One could easily walk this understanding of the partners' informal
contract through the technicalities of contract law, and one Texas
court has done just that. Under general contract law, it is possible to
breach a contract so severely that the other party to the contract is
released from its obligations. "It is a fundamental principle of con-
tract law that when one party to a contract commits a material breach
of that contract, the other party is discharged or excused from further
performance." 232 Texas law contains an intriguing case in which M.R.
Champion was rationalized by counsel in just such fashion.233 In Har-
ris v. Archer, one partner contended that another had materially
breached a partnership agreement.234 The partner argued that "the
material breach effected a dissolution of the partnership and that he
thereafter owed no duty to offer his former partners a business oppor-
tunity which arose after the partnership terminated. He relies on
M.R. Champion, Inc."235
The Harris court rejected a reading of M.R. Champion grounding
the case solely on the general contract law of material breach, how-
ever. The court explained,
In Champion, the jury found that Mizell, a partner, breached the
partnership agreement and also conducted himself in a way that it
232. Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2004) (per
curiam); see BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., Inc. v. N. Alamo Water Supply Corp., 251 S.W.3d 30,
30-31 (Tex. 2007 ) (per curiam) (quoting Mustang Pipeline, 134 S.W.3d at 195, 196); Henry v.
Masson, 333 S.W.3d 825, 840 (Tex. App. 2010) (in the context of a settlement agreement be-
tween partners winding down a partnership, quoting BFI Waste Systems, 251 S.W.3d 30-31
(quoting Mustang Pipeline, 134 S.W.3d at 196)).
233. Harris v. Archer, 134 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. App. 2004).
234. Id. at 430.
235. Id. at 446.
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was not reasonably practicable to carry on partnership business.
Based on such jury finding, the trial court found that Mizell's con-
duct effected a termination of the partnership. Champion does not
hold that a material breach of a partnership agreement, without
more, effects a dissolution of the partnership. 236
In support, the Harris court cited the withdrawal statute then in force
in Texas.237
What is the "more" that M.R. Champion & Harris requires? The
logical reading of these cases is that the court doubted whether a find-
ing of withdrawal ("dissolution" under the older code) is the proper
remedy for every material breach of a partnership agreement. After
all, releasing one from contractual obligations is not the same remedy
as declaring that withdrawal from a partnership occurred. 238 How-
ever, when the material breach is exactly the conduct warranting a
decree of judicial expulsion under the statute and makes carrying on
the partnership business impracticable, withdrawal is, in fact, the ef-
fect of material breach. This is the something "more" that Harris ap-
pears to require.239
The result is a finding that the partners' agreement as to their part-
nership has been breached in a way that justifies withdrawal as a rem-
edy. As noted, this agreement is mostly tacit. It is agreement, as
Monteleone says, "implicitly by virtue of the nature of the partnership
itself."240 An earlier California court reasoned, "In some cases where
the breach is serious and unequivocal . . . [,] the misconduct really
dissolves the partnership." 241 This is the kind of material breach war-
ranting a finding of withdrawal, or its equivalent, whether we say it is
based on contract or the contractual basis of the parties' understand-
ings. In fact, keeping the offending partner in the partnership contract
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See also Fisher v. Fisher, 212 N.E.2d 222, 224 (Mass. 1965) ("There is no provision in the
agreement or in the Uniform Partnership Act that a breach is equivalent to withdrawal from the
partnership, and we will not imply one.")
239. The Fisher case is not inconsistent in its result. Though the Fisher court held that "oust-
ing" the partner guilty of misconduct was "wrongful action," the court also held that the partner-
ship was dissolved as of the date of the ouster and that the ousted partner was not entitled to
profits from the partnership after that date. Id. at 224. The court grounded this move on
"[e]quity and the furtherance of justice." Id.
240. Monteleone v. Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d 1221, 1224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (citing Hillman,
supra note 39, at 538-39); see also Vangel v. Vangel, 254 P.2d 919, 924-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953)
(holding that no legally recognized harm occurred when two partners took a check that a third
partner had given into possession of a bank, cashed it, and distributed the proceeds to them-
selves and the third partner after depositing needed sums in the partnership account and reason-
ing that the partners accurately assessed the partnerships needs even though they misapplied the
proceeds).
241. Vangel, 254 P.2d at 926.
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at that point would be unconscionable. 242 Either way, in the case of
Jerry, Nick, and Lorenzo Monteleone, the court is justified in holding
that Jerry has taken himself out of the partnership by his conduct, or
at least given Nick and Lorenzo the right to declare that Jerry is no
longer a partner, should they elect.
This is why courts granting a judicial decree of withdrawal some-
times date the time of the withdrawal to the partner's misconduct.243
There is merely procedural, not substantive, difference between (i)
granting judicial withdrawal and dating the time of the withdrawal to
the date of the misconduct, on the one hand, and (ii) a court's declar-
ing that the partner guilty of serious misconduct withdrew on the date
of the misconduct. On substance, these are identical. Because the
true ground for both is contractual and the relevant contractual event
is the partner's misconduct, the proper rationalization of these cases is
that withdrawal occurred by the misconduct on the date of the
misconduct.
This misconduct is wrongful, morally if not legally. It may or may
not be a "wrongful withdrawal," given that section 152.503 defines
"wrongful" such that the label is inappropriate before a decree ex-
ists.244 Perhaps none of the specific consequences of "wrongful with-
drawal" as defined in the statute must occur.245 But it may be
withdrawal nonetheless, and presumably other contract remedies, in-
cluding contractual damages, would be an appropriate remedy for it.
On the other hand, it is also possible to follow the understanding of
the partners in the informal partnership more fully. If the court un-
derstands that Monteleone and M.R. Champion best fit the partners'
understanding of the nature of their partnership-that they have
agreed in their informal way that conduct such as Jerry's and Mizell's
would be wrongful, then they may be held to the conclusion that the
kind of withdrawal committed by Jerry and Mizell is wrongful.
In that case, the partners have created grounds for the court to hold
that wrongful withdrawal occurred on the date of the wrongful con-
duct. They have done this because it is what they most reasonably
expected, and because holding in line with the reasonable expecta-
242. Unconscionability as grounds for relief from a contract, and the court's discretion regard-
ing relief for unconscionability, are addressed in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208
(1981) ("[A] court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable
term as to avoid any unconscionable result.").
243. See supra note 187.
244. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.503(b)(3) (2013).
245. See id. §§ 152.602(b), 152.603, 152.604.
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tions of the parties will be the most efficient, most moral, and most
just resolution of their dispute.
III. WHAT TO Do
All of the four methods described in Section II for characterizing
self-help conduct in the break-up of an informal partnership are justi-
fied by the law, either by clear statutory provision or, given a proper
factual showing, by those provisions supplemented by the law of con-
tract and equitable principles. Because these methods are all legally
available to a court confronting a self-help fact pattern, the court has
the means to reach a moral, efficient, and just result.
If the informal agreement of the partners and the conduct of an
offending partner warrant a finding that the partnership agreement
has been materially breached and that it is not reasonably practicable
to carry on the partnership business as a result of the offending con-
duct, then the court may find the breaching party has withdrawn from
the partnership as of the date of the wrongful conduct. If the breach
of the partnership agreement, even an informal agreement, is egre-
gious enough that the impracticability of continuing as a partnership is
obvious, then support for the reasonable expectations of the partners
strongly suggests this result. This principle best explains the outcome
in Monteleone246 and M.R. Champion.247
On the other hand, if the offending conduct is not egregious enough
to amount to material breach, or the carrying on of the partnership
remains reasonably practicable, the court might find that the partners
who engaged in self-help conduct withdrew from the partnership, or
not, depending on whether the meaning of their conduct, in context,
expressed a will to withdraw. These principles explain Ingram v.
Deere,248 Rhue v. Dawson,249 In re Leal,250 Young v. Qualls,25 1 Ball v.
Britton,252 and Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft v. Beasley.253 De-
pending on whether self-help conduct that excluded a partner ex-
pressed a will to withdraw, the court might also find that exclusion of
a partner breached the excluded partner's rights as an owner and
246. Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d at 1223.
247. M.R. Champion, Inc. v. Mizell, 904 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
248. Ingram v. Deere, 198 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. App. 2006), rev'd on other grounds 288 S.W.3d 886
(Tex. 2009).
249. Rhue v. Dawson, 841 P.2d 215 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
250. In re Leal, 360 B.R. 231 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007).
251. Young v. Qualls, 279 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. App. 2005).
252. Ball v. Britton, 58 Tex. 57 (Tex. 1882).
253. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft v. Beasley, 728 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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manager of the firm, as the courts held in Leal,2 54 Young, 255 Ball,256
and Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft.257 These rules harmonize the
self-help cases. At root, the reasonable expectations of the parties in
context should be respected.
The default rules governing businesses need not provide more clar-
ity for better planning. Those who plan ahead can contract for
whatever clarity they wish. In the cases, the parties themselves have
not specified a legal category into which their conduct should fit. Fol-
lowing their reasonable expectations, inasmuch as they can be dis-
cerned, allows the parties' contracts to bear fruit while prohibiting the
parties from taking advantage of each other. The lack of clarity is a
cost they should bear. They have opened themselves up to the risk of
a court's interpreting their conduct in various ways. As Hillman
noted, partners engaging in self-help must be "prepared to assume the
risk that their assessment of the wrongfulness of the conduct of the
offensive partner may not withstand judicial review." 258 The partners
have failed to specify explicitly any rule for interpreting their conduct
and therefore made a difficult factual determination (including per-
haps, a trial) all but necessary. The difficulty and expense of settling
the legal meaning of self-help conduct will surely deter the partners
from entering into another relationship without better planning or at
least strongly urge them to contact a lawyer next time, before they
change the locks. The difficulty of the determination is penalty
enough, without a default rule also penalizing them, as it surely would
penalize some if it were more specific. The law should encourage
even people who do not know (or know how to manipulate) the law to
use their time productively, even if that encouragement can only be
given post hoc.
254. 360 B.R. at 240.
255. 279 S.W.3d at 673-75.
256. 58 Tex. at 62-63.
257. 728 So. 2d at 255.
258. Hillman, supra note 39, at 543.

